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Introduction
With the rise of treaty-based investor-state dispute settlement (“ISDS”)
which has taken place over the last two decades,1 a number of governments
have adopted varying approaches to avoid those arbitration cases. Countries including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Mexico, Mongolia, and
Peru have pursued such initiatives, often with the support of intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations Convention on Trade and
Development (“UNCTAD”) and the World Bank.
In the context of discussions on ISDS reform taking place at the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”),
some states have identiﬁed development and implementation of such ISDSavoidance strategies and tools as initiatives they would like to pursue. There
remains, however, relatively little dialogue and research exploring the comparative institutional design, functional workings, and costs and beneﬁts of
diﬀerent approaches, and identifying, articulating, and disseminating lessons
learned from experiences to date.
This article draws from a broader research project exploring the eﬀectiveness of dispute prevention approaches (and perceptions thereof) at resolving
underlying conﬂicts between investors and states, and at their implications
for other stakeholders.2 Understanding how dispute prevention approaches
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UNCTAD, Investor-state dispute settlement cases pass the 1,000 mark: cases and outcomes in 2019, IIA Issues Note (July 2020).
2

Many of the approximately 1,000 publicly-known treaty-based ISDS cases have related
to sectors or projects where the interests of communities, consumers, or other local stake-
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can and do operate and whether and how they can provide meaningful and
lasting solutions to the broader conﬂicts underlying investor-state disputes
can critically inform the assessment of existing approaches and the design
of new ones.3
I.

Dispute Prevention: Two Basic Approaches and Variations
Within Them

The rapid and consistent rise of ISDS claims against governments has accelerated and shaped national and international discussions around strategies
for preventing such arbitration claims. Governments are increasingly deeming the expense of arbitration, the reputational cost of an ISDS claim or
liability, and the potential for a high damages award (both in the speciﬁc
case and in ISDS cases more generally), to be unacceptably high.4 Thereholders are directly aﬀected by the underlying dispute, including, for instance, related to
extractive industry or other land-based investments, or to the delivery, quality and cost of
water, electricity, and other services.
3
This article focuses on dispute prevention mechanisms (“DPMs”) designed to avoid
ISDS-disputes; however other potential, sometimes overlapping, objectives motivate the objectives and design of DPMs, including: attracting or retaining investment or attracting
reinvestment (see Maria Borga et al., Drivers of divestment decisions of multinational enterprises—A cross-country ﬁrm-level perspective, OECD Working Papers on Int’l Investment,
No. 2019/03 (2020)); avoiding disgruntled investors; promoting beneﬁcial and mutuallyaccepted outcomes from investment; fostering reform of domestic policies and institutions;
and capacity-building. Some countries, such as Brazil, adopt DPMs while rejecting ISDS.
See Richard C. Chen, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Cosmetic Institutional Reform, 55
Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 547 (2017). The objectives of DPMs are critical to their design and
assessment, as is explained later in this article.
4

See, e.g., United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Dispute prevention and mitigation—means
of alternative dispute resolution, Note by the Secretariat, A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.190, 36 (Jan. 15, 2020). For more on the costs of ISDS, see, e.g., Lise Johnson et al.,
Costs and Beneﬁts of Investment Treaties: Practical considerations for states, Columbia
Center on Sustainable Investment (Mar. 2018), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/2018/04/20/
costs-beneﬁts-iias/; Joachim Pohl, Societal Beneﬁts and Costs of International Investment Agreements: A critical review of aspects and available empirical evidence, OECD
(Jan. 2018), https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/ﬁnance-and-investment/societal-beneﬁts-andcosts-of-international-investment-agreements_e5f85c3d-en. On the use of DPMs as tools
to avoid the costs of ISDS, see, e.g., World Bank Group, Retention and Expansion of Foreign Direct Investment: Political Risk and Policy Responses, 36 (2019); United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law, Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Dispute prevention and mitigation—means of alternative dispute resolution, Note by
the Secretariat, A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.190, 3-6 (Jan. 15, 2020).

2021]

Investor-State Dispute Prevention

ISDS-Elevating Approaches: The role of investment
treaty obligations and threat of ISDS is emphasized
within domestic law and institutions. May include:

ISDS-Minimizing Approaches: The threat of ISDS
is minimized, often through treaty approaches
(though obligations of IIAs may still be emphasized).
May include:

use of high-level committees to seek and secure
resolution of potential ISDS claims

use of state-to-state ﬁlters or state-to-state dispute
resolution to limit or control investor access to ISDS

training to help ensure domestic actors are mindful
of and avoid triggering ISDS claims

requirements for investors to exhaust domestic remedies so as to encourage and enable resolution of
disputes in domestic courts rather than through
ISDS (may enable direct claims for treaty breach in
domestic courts)
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Table 1: ISDS Prevention: Two Main Types of Approaches
fore, their objective is to avoid, to the greatest extent possible, all such
claims.
There are several approaches governments have taken to avoid ISDS disputes. We group these approaches into two broad, non-exclusive categories:
those that seek to limit the availability of ISDS (relative to domestic, stateto-state, or other dispute resolution methods) as a means of reducing such
cases, and others that seek to avoid ISDS disputes by amplifying and elevating the voice of investors and their powers to bring ISDS claims (Table
1).5
A.

ISDS-Minimizing Approaches

ISDS-minimizing approaches reduce the availability of, exposure to, and risk
of ISDS.6 This could be by reducing access to ISDS, narrowing the scope
of permissible claims, or increasing the procedural requirements prior to
5

For further discussion on investor protections under IIAs, see Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, Primer: International Investment Treaties and Investor-State Dispute
Settlement (2019).
6
For instance, in the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”), which is working on ISDS reform, some of these approaches, including stateto-state dispute settlement and exhaustion of local remedies, are being examined as
part of reforms designed to prevent or mitigate ISDS claims. See, e.g., United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law, Working Group III: ISDS Reform, Strengthening of Dispute Prevention Mechanisms other Than Mediation (Ombudsman, Mediation),
https://uncitral.un.org/en/strengtheningmechanisms (last visited Mar. 17, 2021) (listing
exhaustion of local remedies as a potential relevant reform, and containing a working paper
referring to state-to-state ﬁlters, ombuds mechanisms, and other similar approaches).
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accessing ISDS. Reducing access to ISDS could be achieved through more
limited eligibility for claimants, greater exceptions or carve-outs, or through
ﬁlter mechanisms that give state actors greater control to determine whether
an ISDS claim can proceed. For instance, treaties can require that an ISDS
claim can only proceed if the states party to the treaty agree that the
claim(s) can go ahead, or fail to agree that the claim cannot; in many
such cases, treaty parties designate domestic oﬃcials or institutions with
resolving the disputes on a technical level, with arbitration only allowed if
oﬃcials cannot agree or miss the deadline to do so. This approach, found in
a number of treaties, is most commonly used when the ISDS claim relates
to a sensitive or technical issue, such as ﬁnancial services regulation or
taxation.7 Some treaties allow for diplomatic resolution prior to a dispute
going to arbitration, or include state-to-state dispute settlement in lieu of
ISDS altogether.8
States can also narrow the scope of permissible claims by reducing substantive protections enforceable through ISDS. Under this approach, while
the treaty may contain various substantive protections for investors, investors are only entitled to invoke a subset before arbitral tribunals, such
as claims for direct expropriation, discrimination, and denials of justice.
A state could also permit ISDS, but require that investors exhaust domestic remedies prior to bringing their ISDS claims. Exhaustion can poten7

Lise Johnson et al., International Investment Agreements, 2014:
New Approaches, in Yearbook on International Investment Law &
(Andrea K. Bjorklund ed., 2016); Catherine Titi, Non-adjudicatory
in Investment Dispute Prevention and Dispute Settlement: Joint
and Focal Points, 14:2 Revista de Direito Internacional 37 (2017).
8

A Review of Trends and
Policy 2014-2015, 44-47
State-State Mechanisms
Interpretations, Filters,

See, e.g., references to these approaches in United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Dispute prevention and mitigation—means of alternative dispute resolution, Note by the Secretariat,
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.190, 12 (Jan. 15, 2020). Brazilian CFIAs do not provide for investorstate arbitration at all. Focal Points from each member-state coordinate between investors
and government authorities in addressing investor complaints; implementation of CFIA’s dispute settlement mechanism through consultations and mediation. Fabio Morosini & Michelle
Ratton Sanchez Badin, The Brazilian Agreement on Cooperation and Facilitation of Investments (ACFI): A New Formula for International Investment Agreements? Investment
Treaty News (Aug. 2015); Catherine Titi, Non-adjudicatory State-State Mechanisms in Investment Dispute Prevention and Dispute Settlement: Joint Interpretations, Filters, and
Focal Points, Revista de Direito Internacional (2017).
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tially ﬁlter out some ISDS cases by providing a resolution at the domestic
level; and it can also enable other actors in the government to identify when
a domestic dispute might evolve into an ISDS dispute meriting attention
from other types of dispute prevention approaches discussed further below.
These are all approaches that seek to minimize the role of ISDS in
the broader investment policy landscape, placing greater emphasis on other
tools and fora such as domestic legal systems and institutions or inter-state
diplomacy and dispute resolution to resolve investors’ complaints about
their host states’ conduct.9
B.

ISDS-Elevating Approaches

In contrast, a diﬀerent category of approaches, and one on which this article focuses, elevates the role and impact of ISDS in the broader domestic
investment policy landscape (even while seeking to avoid the use of ISDS).
Some of these approaches may create new institutional structures such as
inter-ministerial committees that will be apprised of, and have powers and
responsibilities to resolve, ISDS claims or threats thereof.10 While these
approaches may take a variety of forms, and vary in terms of their degree
9

For example, many of these approaches can be found in the recently renegotiated North
American Free Trade Agreement between the U.S., Canada, and Mexico. ISDS is excluded
between the U.S. and Canada, and limited between the U.S. and Mexico through narrowing
actionable claims, requiring exhaustion, integrating state-to-state ﬁlters, and other tools.
10

For example, South Korea has set up the Oﬃce of the Foreign Investment Ombudsman
(“OIO”). The Investment Aftercare Team works directly with companies to oﬀer advice and
information, and also coordinates with public oﬃcials to work to improve the investment
environment based on investor feedback. All agencies within the government are required
to cooperate with the OIO. The Regulatory Reform Committee and Foreign Investment
Committee lead on regulatory reform and investment policymaking, respectively, informed
largely by feedback collected by the OIO. UNCTAD, Investor-State Disputes: Prevention
and Alternatives to Arbitration, UNCTAD Series on International Investment Policies for Development, United Nations, New York and Geneva, UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/11 (2010).
Bosnia & Herzegovina established a Negotiating Body charged with handling investor complaints, consisting of permanent representatives from (1) Oﬃce of the State Attorney, (2)
Ministry of Finance and Treasury, (3) Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations,
and (4) Ministry of Justice. When taking up a speciﬁc investor complaint, this Body is joined
by (1) one legal entity charged by the investor with causing the dispute, (2) the competent
authority within the state responsible for the area in which investment is located, and (3)
competent state attorneys. Decision on the establishing the Negotiating Body of Bosnia and
Herzegovina for the Peaceful Settlement of International Investment Disputes (2017) Oﬃcial
Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina, No. 17/18.
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of institutionalization, centralization, and powers, in this article, we refer
to these ISDS-elevating approaches generally as ISDS “dispute prevention
mechanisms” or DPMs.
Some DPMs may be tasked with conﬁdentially settling all suits. They
might be able to employ such high-powered tactics as eﬀectively overriding
the decisions of other ministries or branches of governments, or subnational
jurisdictions. If, for example, a mining company’s notice of an ISDS claim
were triggered by the environmental agency’s denial of a required environmental permit, this DPM could have broad power to (conﬁdentially)11 settle
the case by oﬀering compensation or awarding the permit on terms suﬃcient
to cause the investor to drop its suit.
Other models might similarly prioritize the resolution of ISDS claims,
but do not confer such great powers on the relevant DPM. These models
might, for instance, require that other government actors give a high-level
national DPM notice of any potential ISDS dispute their actions triggered,12
but not empower that DPM to override those other government actors responsible for the challenged conduct. Rather, the DPM’s powers to resolve
complaints regarding other national or federal-level actors might include
conducting negotiations, recommending certain courses of action, or placing political or “peer pressure” on other government agencies.13 The DPMs
might not be able to conclude agreements that are legally binding on other
11

Settlements of ISDS cases are commonly conﬁdential. In conversations with oﬃcials
engaged in eﬀorts to resolve or settle ISDS claims or threats thereof, conﬁdentiality was
often cited by oﬃcials as being useful for securing agreements with investors. But there are
public costs associated with private settlements. For a discussion of the issue and prevalence
of conﬁdential settlements in ISDS, and arguments in favor and against conﬁdentiality in
that context, see, e.g., Emilie M. Hafner-Burton et al., Against Secrecy: The Social Cost of
International Dispute Settlement, 42 Yale J. Int’l L. 279 (2017).
12

For example, through Peru’s State Coordination and Response System for International
Investment Disputes, domestic agencies inform the central government about issues with
investors and seek a resolution through the involvement of the central authorities. An early
alert function allows the Commission to engage and act early on to prevent disputes. UNCTAD, Investor-State Disputes: Prevention and Alternatives to Arbitration, UNCTAD Series
on International Investment Policies for Development, UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/11 (2010);
Ricardo Ampuero Llerena, Peru’s State Coordination and Response System for International
Investment Disputes, Investment Treaty News (Jan. 2013).
13
World Bank Group, Retention and Expansion of Foreign Direct Investment: Political
Risk and Policy Responses 43 (2019).
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government actors or entities,14 but they may be able to elevate the disputes
to higher political levels capable of concluding or causing the conclusion of
such agreements.
Reﬂecting this type of approach, the World Bank, which has been involved in establishing DPMs in a number of countries, states that the lead
agency of such a mechanism may lack the expertise and legal authority to
override a regulator’s decision, especially in technical and highly regulated
areas; nevertheless, it counsels, the DPM, which the World Bank titles a
“Systemic Investor Response Mechanism” or SIRM, could use political and
other means to convince the relevant agency to help the investor achieve
its desired outcome and avoid a legal dispute. That pressure, the World
Bank explains, can include highlighting to the public the potential loss of
jobs, loss of investment, and ISDS liability associated with the challenged
conduct.15
Another variation involves DPMs that are not able to override decisions of other national or federal level actors, but are empowered to settle
claims involving alleged wrongdoing by subnational governments, even if
that means eﬀectively vetoing decisions of those subnational entities or requiring the subnational entities to pay compensation agreed by the DPM.
Finally, some DPMs mostly play roles as informational conduits. They
might have early warning and notice systems through which governments
and/or investors are to ﬂag potential ISDS disputes to the DPMs. Once
notiﬁed, the DPM might then seek to facilitate a resolution between the
investor and government and support its implementation. The DPM might
also provide training to government oﬃcials that deal with or are likely to
deal with foreign investors regarding how to ensure their conduct does not
violate their IIA obligations. The aim of such trainings is to mainstream
concerns about investor protection and ISDS risks into government decisionmaking at national and, at times, sub-national levels.
14
It is important to note though that even if an agreement concluded by a DPM is not
legally binding or valid under domestic law, a tribunal may deem it valid and binding under
the protections oﬀered by investment treaties.
15

World Bank Group, Retention and Expansion of Foreign Direct Investment: Political
Risk and Policy Responses, 45 (2019).
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Figure 1. ISDS-Elevating Approaches: A Possible Range of Powers
Each of these approaches elevates the power of ISDS and ISDS claims,
either by advising government oﬃcials to avoid taking any measures that
might elicit an ISDS claim or by rapidly responding to threatened or actual
claims in ways that may be contrary to otherwise applicable domestic policy
or procedure.
Figure 1 illustrates possible powers and approaches of these ISDSelevating DPMs. Those authorized to employ high-power tactics may also
utilize any of the lower-powered tactics.
II.

Evaluating the Costs and Beneﬁts of ISDS-Avoidance
Strategies

These two models—ISDS-minimizing and ISDS-elevating—diﬀer among and
between themselves in their ability to achieve the overarching objective of
avoiding or resolving ISDS claims. And, crucially, they diﬀer in terms of
their other costs and beneﬁts. Broadly, ISDS-minimizing approaches seek
to minimize the risk and impact of ISDS claims by reducing the scope for
such claims, favoring domestic and other technical or diplomatic means of
resolving disputes. By contrast, with ISDS-elevating approaches, the threat
of ISDS is used to give heightened legal and political powers and/or duties
to certain actors within government (e.g., central level executive oﬃcials)
to address investor concerns. This, in turn, may increase both the power of
ISDS for claimants and the power of investors due to their increased ISDS-
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related voice and leverage. This section focuses on some of the potential
beneﬁts and costs of each of these types of DPMs. While not exhaustive,
the illustrative costs and beneﬁts highlight the potential range of impacts
and especially the challenges in assessing those costs and beneﬁts.
A.

Potential beneﬁts and measurement issues

Recall the hypothetical example of a mining company’s threatening or ﬁling
an ISDS claim because the environmental agency denied a required environmental permit. With ISDS-minimizing approaches, the threat or risk
of such a claim may be reduced, for instance by circumscribing the scope
of investor protections to avoid suggesting investors have a ‘right’ to environmental permits, ﬁltering the assessment of the environmental agency’s
decision through technical experts or oﬃcials as designated by the treaty
parties, or requiring that the mining company exhaust all domestic judicial
and administrative remedies. The beneﬁts of these approaches are the reduced exposure to ISDS claims and liability, and the increased ability of
domestic institutions (including administrative agencies and judicial mechanisms) to consider such issues that arise in the course of investments, to
resolve them in line with domestic and international law and policy, and
to engage domestic stakeholders and institutions in understanding whether
and what adjustments need to be made to the way investment is governed
in law and in practice. This approach also maintains the integrity of environmental review processes and the legitimacy of the permitting process for
other applicants, including domestic actors who would not have recourse to
ISDS.
With an ISDS-elevating mechanism in this hypothetical example, a
DPM may be able to override the environmental agency’s denial of the
permit, or place adequate pressure on the agency to do so. If the DPM
were able to cause the issuance of that permit on the terms demanded by
the investor, then the DPM could report that it both prevented the ISDS
claim (and avoided major ﬁnancial loses had the ISDS case been successful) and retained the investment, including the corresponding jobs, ﬁscal
revenues, and so on.
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Accurately measuring the beneﬁts of either type of approach is challenging. It is diﬃcult to quantify or even to qualitatively ascribe value to the integrity, legitimacy, and capacity of domestic institutions to resolve disputes.
Domestic ‘rule of law’ is a generally accepted value for domestic institutions
and judicial systems; but disaggregating its components and valuing its individual elements is exceedingly diﬃcult, if not impossible. Accordingly, the
beneﬁts of approaches that seek to rely upon, and holistically strengthen,
domestic institutions may be underestimated. While data is lacking, and
while outcomes would likely depend on the speciﬁc strategies adopted by the
relevant state or states, we hypothesize that ISDS-minimizing approaches,
which place greater emphasis on the interest and ability of domestic institutions to self-correct, would generally produce greater beneﬁts for the
functioning of domestic institutions than ISDS-elevating approaches, which
may seek to achieve investors’ preferred outcomes by displacing or distorting
the standard functioning of domestic systems.16
Estimating the value of either an averted ISDS claim or a retained investment is also exceedingly challenging. An investor seeking a favorable
government response, for instance, might overstate the investment it seeks
to make, the length of time it expects to stay in the country, and the number
and quality of jobs it expected to create or keep in the future. (It may also
downplay the potential negative impacts the investment may have, such as
those on the environment, local communities, or local competitors). Similarly, an investor might give inﬂated estimates of the proﬁts it expects to
generate and taxes it can bring in when seeking DPM assistance, or when
threatening an ISDS claim. It can be diﬃcult for a government to check
the accuracy of such projections; and the investor would presumably not be
bound by its representations regarding future operations.
An investor might also overstate the relevance of the government’s decision for its investment or divestment decisions. The investor may threaten
16
See, e.g., Mavluda Sattarova, The Impact of Investment Treaty Law on Host States:
Enabling Good Governance (2018); Lise Johnson et al., Aligning International Investment
Agreements with the Sustainable Development Goals, 58 Colum J. Transnat’l L. 58 (2019);
Lise Johnson et al., Alternatives to Investor-State Dispute Settlement, Columbia Center on
Sustainable Investment (2019).
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to exit the country in response to a government’s decision, but the threat
to leave and to pursue the ISDS case may be more of a bargaining tool
rather than a serious plan.17 Similarly, the investor may already be contemplating divestment for challenging or underperforming projects, but use
the threat of ISDS so as to extract value from the otherwise disappointing
investment.18 As the OECD notes, divestment is not uncommon.19 And
while the number of investors that elect to divest very likely dwarfs and
will continue to dwarf the number of investors that choose to bring ISDS
disputes, it is plausible that investors considering divestment decisions use
ISDS or the threat thereof to put what may have been poorly planned or
executed projects in a better position than market and policy conditions
would have otherwise allowed.20 The rise of ISDS-elevating DPMs may increase the frequency with which ISDS is invoked and threatened in relation
to potentially inevitable divestment decisions, and cause special treatment
to be unduly aﬀorded to doomed projects.21 Moreover, just as an investor
17

One of the authors has documented the use of such divestment threats in the context
of proposed or actual ﬁscal reforms, ﬁnding that despite their threats of divestment in the
face of ﬁscal reforms, investors do not in fact leave if projects remain proﬁtable. See Lisa E.
Sachs, et al., Impacts of ﬁscal reforms on country attractiveness: Learning from the facts, in
Yearbook on International Investment Law & Policy 2011-2012, 345-86 (2013).
18
Examples of projects in which the investor decided to sue for early phase investments,
which very likely would not have proceeded to the next phase of exploitation or construction for reasons outside of the state’s control, include Glamis Gold v. U.S.; Bear Creek v.
Peru, and TCC v. Pakistan. Versant Partners, Valuation of Early State Investments: Recent
Trends and Perspectives (2019). In the case of TCC v. Pakistan, for example, the tribunal
awarded billions of dollars in damages through the estimation of “future lost proﬁts[,]” despite the fact that the investor had never secured the approvals necessary to begin intended
mining construction, nor secured the contractual terms on which compensation for future
lost proﬁts was based. Caroline Simson, Scrutiny Creeps in On Damages in Investment Arbitration, Law360 (Oct. 2019); Tethyan Copper v. Pakistan Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/1
(2012). Similarly, in Bear Creek v. Peru, the investor had not obtained the approvals required
by Peru to obtain an exploitation license for the project. Nonetheless, it was awarded a total
of $30.4 million. Bear Creek v. Peru Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21 (2015).
19

Maria Borga et al., Drivers of divestment decisions of multinational enterprises—A
cross-country ﬁrm-level perspective, OECD Working Papers on Intl Investment, No. 2019/03
(2020).
20

World Bank Group, Retention and Expansion of Foreign Direct Investment: Political
Risk and Policy Responses 33 (2019).
21
Project failure is not uncommon; failures may be due to various factors, including
ﬂawed project conception, management, or operation. One study of the Commonwealth
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may seek regulatory and other incentives for investments it would make
even without those beneﬁts, an investor may ultimately divest irrespective
of what regulatory or other concessions the host state oﬀers.22
Beneﬁts of both types of ISDS-avoidance approaches are therefore difﬁcult to measure. Certain measurement issues (value of the project, value
of a potential ISDS claim, risk of divestment of a project) are common to
both ISDS-minimizing and ISDS-elevating strategies. On balance, however,
the beneﬁts of ISDS-minimizing approaches are prone to under-assessment
(due, e.g., to the challenges of valuing elements of and eﬀects on domestic
rule of law), while the beneﬁts of ISDS-elevating approaches are likely prone
to over-statement, due to reliance on investors’ statements and assertions,
and incentives investors may have to inﬂate the value of ISDS claims.23
Development Corporation’s investments in 179 projects in 32 countries throughout
Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia and the Paciﬁc between 1948 and 2000 found
that 49 percent of the projects were ﬁnancial failures, and concluded that the major
cause of 60 percent of those failures was that the project concept was “fatally ﬂawed,
for example wrong location, wrong crop, or overoptimistic planning assumptions.” Geoﬀ
Tyler & Grahame Dixie, Investing in Agribusiness: A Retrospective View of a Development
Bank’s Investments in Agribusiness in Africa and Southeast Asia and the Paciﬁc, Agriculture and Environmental Services Discussion Paper No. 1, 3 (The World Bank 2013),
https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/
384141468008773142/investing-in-agribusiness-a-retrospective-view-of-a-developmentbanks-investments-in-agribusiness-in-africa-and-southeast-asia-and-the-paciﬁc). In comparison, about 10 percent of failures were linked to government policies, and 13 percent to
“bad luck.” Id. With ISDS, a risk is that otherwise valueless projects due to poor planning
or poor execution can nevertheless seek to manufacture value by shifting narratives about
project failure and creating (saleable) legal claims for hundreds of millions if not billions of
dollars. ISDS-elevating DPMs may magnify that risk.
22
Maria Borga et al., Drivers of divestment decisions of multinational enterprises—A
cross-country ﬁrm-level perspective, OECD Working Papers on International Investment,
No. 2019/03 (2020).
23

See, e.g., George Kahale III, Rethinking ISDS, 44 Brooklyn J. Int’l L 11, 39 (2018)
(referring to the reasons for and practice of overstating the value of a compensation claim).
Even outside the context of an ISDS claim, an investor would likely have incentives to inﬂate
both the signiﬁcance of its investment to the host economy, and the signiﬁcance of the
relevant grievance to the investor’s future investment decisions, so as to encourage the DPM
to address the investor’s complaints. On average, damages awarded are 34% of the amount
claimed by the investor. Tim Hart & Rebecca Vélez, Study of Damages in International
Center for the Settlement of Investment Dispute Cases, TDM 3 (2014), www.transnationaldispute-management.com.
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Potential costs and measurement issues

Alongside the potential beneﬁts of ISDS-avoidance approaches in terms of
preventing costly ISDS cases or awards and potentially retaining investments and their beneﬁts, there are also costs to be considered. First and
most directly are the actual costs associated with the relevant approach,
including its staﬃng and activities. With ISDS-minimizing approaches, the
direct costs might include those associated with any extra work required of
domestic oﬃcials or institutions to resolve disputes through domestic fora
or treaty bodies.
With ISDS-elevating DPMs, the direct costs include not only the staﬃng
and activities of the mechanism itself but also any ﬁnancial settlement facilitated by the DPM or waiver of taxes levied on the investor. The administrative costs of DPMs are straightforward to measure, while the sums
claimed by the investor, and corresponding amounts paid or forgone by the
government, are more diﬃcult to predict ex ante. While there may also
be settlement costs associated with domestic resolution of disputes through
ISDS-minimizing approaches, remedies available under domestic law are generally more limited than those awarded by ISDS tribunals.24 The settlement
costs (and beneﬁts in terms of avoided litigation and liability) are likely to
be lower with ISDS-minimizing approaches than ISDS-elevating DPMs.
Other costs are more diﬃcult to assess. For ISDS-minimizing approaches, reducing the scope of ISDS may require the renegotiation of bilateral or multilateral investment treaties or investor-state contracts that
provide for expansive ISDS. The actual and political costs of such renegotiation will vary tremendously among countries, based on the number of such
agreements, their diplomatic relationships, domestic politics, and other factors. States may also consider that reducing ISDS may have an impact on
investment ﬂows, although extensive research has failed to show that ISDS
has a positive impact on investment ﬂows.25
24

See, e.g., OECD, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Public Consultation Scoping Paper,
25-26 (2012).
25
Joachim Pohl, Societal beneﬁts and costs of International Investment Agreements: A
critical review of aspects and available empirical evidence, OECD Working Papers on International Investment, No. 2018/01 (2018).
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Many costs of ISDS-elevating DPMs are also diﬃcult to assess. In the
hypothetical example of the dispute over the denied mining permit, for instance, if the DPM were to override or cause a shift in the environmental
agency’s determination, associated costs could include increased negative
environmental externalities generated by the mining permit (which could
harm individuals, communities, and other businesses such as agricultural
and tourism operations), and loss of positive externalities that might have
been generated by more stringent regulatory standards. Indeed, some government measures such as adopting stronger environmental regulations or
raising labor wages and standards—measures which are taken on behalf
of the public interest—have been found to increase the chance of multinational enterprise (“MNE”) divestment.26 This further indicates that actions
DPMs might take to resolve investor complaints, in some cases overriding
or waiving such important public measures, could come at a substantial (if
diﬃcult to measure) cost to other stakeholders.
The eﬀect of DPMs on other domestic interests and stakeholders is likely
exacerbated by the fact that a signiﬁcant percentage of ISDS disputes—70%
by some estimates—“involve measures adopted by subnational or sectorspeciﬁc regulatory agencies.”27 While DPMs have been touted for their
very ability to eﬃciently discipline such subnational or specialized agencies,
and to cause the government to speak with one, more investor-responsive,
voice,28 this approach can have negative eﬀects. It may demote local authorities and the local constituencies to which they are accountable, and
depress the role of government agencies responsible for advancing other policy priorities such as environmental protection, social equality and security,
and sound government budgeting.
26
Maria Borga et al., Drivers of divestment decisions of multinational enterprises—A
cross-country ﬁrm-level perspective, OECD Working Papers on Int’l Investment, No. 2019/03
(2020).
27

World Bank Group, Retention and Expansion of Foreign Direct Investment: Political
Risk and Policy Responses, 30 (2019) (citing Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes
of Investment Treaty Arbitration, Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons (2008) and UNCTAD, World Investment Report (2010)).
28
See, e.g., World Bank Group, Retention and Expansion of Foreign Direct Investment:
Political Risk and Policy Responses (2019).
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Loss of faith among diﬀerent stakeholder groups regarding the responsiveness and accountability of their governments to diﬀerent interests is an
incalculable cost of ISDS-elevating DPMs. Moreover, the diﬃculty in measuring these costs makes them prone to under-assessment. Because those
bearing the costs (e.g., taxpayers, residents of a community aﬀected by environmental pollution, users of public institutions) are also often relatively
diﬀuse, or, as is often the case with natural resource projects, relatively
marginalized, there may be limited capacity among stakeholder groups to
independently calculate those costs, or to advocate for the government to
ensure full assessment, minimization, and avoidance of those beneﬁts.
Table 2 illustrates some of the potential costs and beneﬁts of a highpowered ISDS-elevating DPM. Low-powered ISDS-elevating DPMs—i.e.,
whose powers are limited to the powers in the bottom left of Figure 1—will
likely have diﬀerent costs and beneﬁts, as will ISDS-minimizing approaches.
C.

Some insights from practice

At present, it does not appear that the costs and beneﬁts of DPMs are
being adequately accounted for in the design and implementation of DPMs.
Publicly available data on existing DPMs is limited, but information that
does exist indicates there is cause for concern. The “key indicator” for the
World Bank’s SIRM is, for instance, “investment retained.” This is deﬁned
as “investment at risk when the grievance is registered in the SIRM (ex ante)
[minus] investment withdrawn (that is, existing investment withdrawn or
expansion plans put on hold or canceled).”31
31

World Bank Group, Retention and Expansion of Foreign Direct Investment: Political
Risk and Policy Responses, 56 (2019). World Bank documents describing the SIRM illustrate
a narrow approach to cost-beneﬁt analysis. According to the World Bank, a core SIRM task
should be to monitor “how much investment is retained and expanded as a result of the
resolution” of the investors’ grievances. In some cases, the World Bank notes, the lead SIRM
agency “may not have the political authority to discipline another peer agency. In this case,
the problem is elevated to higher political levels, such as the ministerial cabinet and in some
countries special ministerial councils chaired by the president or prime minister. Once a
decision is taken at this higher instance, the lead agency tracks the resolution, positive or
negative, and the impact on investments.” Id. at 43.

Diﬃcult to measure; those aﬀected may be many and diﬀuse

Loss of trust in government institutions due to concerns about the
process or outcomes of resolutions
Can create unequal treatment before the law as not all stakeholders
can similarly invoke the ISDS threat and secure the assistance of a
high-powered DPM
Resolution of ISDS suits

Investment retained

Avoidance of liability

Avoidance of litigation costs

Avoidance of reputational harm associated with ISDS suits

Diﬃcult to measure; those aﬀected may be many and diﬀuse

Negative externalities caused due to settlements

Can be easy to measure (e.g., # of complaints settled), though
indicators may be prone to overestimation
It is unclear whether suits cause such harm; if so, it is diﬃcult to
measure the extent
Estimates of average legal and arbitration costs of ISDS claims are
available, but can ﬂuctuate widely from case to case, as can the ability of winning party to recover those costs from the losing party29
Investors have incentives to overstate their claimed damages; and
predictions regarding the ultimate outcome of an arbitration and
damages claims may be highly uncertain30
Investors have incentives to overstate their willingness to leave if the
dispute is not resolved in their favor; investors (and DPMs) may have
incentives to overstate the amount of investment retained, jobs created/maintained, and other positive spillovers generated. Accurately
measuring these beneﬁts is diﬃcult, as is adequately assessing any
costs imposed by the retained investment.

Diﬃcult to measure; those aﬀected may be many and diﬀuse

Measurement Considerations
Easy to measure
Easy to measure

ISDS-Elevating, High-Powered Tactics
Direct costs of staﬃng and activities
Compensation paid to complaining investors
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30
Tim Hart & Rebecca Vélez, Study of Damages in International Center for the Settlement of Investment Dispute Cases, TDM
3 (2014), www.transnational-dispute-management.com.

A 2017 study concluded that the average costs faced by respondent states to defend ISDS cases is $5 million (U.S.). (Matthew
Hodgson & Alistair Campbell, Damages and Costs in Investment Treaty Arbitration Revisited, Allen & Overy ((2017)). Some cases
cost several times more than the average, amounting to upwards of tens of millions of dollars in legal and other fees and arbitration
costs. In TCC v. Pakistan, for instance, Pakistan reported spending roughly $25 million (U.S.) on legal and expert fees and costs.
(TCC v. Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/1, Award, July 12, 2019, 613-14). The signiﬁcance of these expenses for a given country
will vary depending on the size and resources of that country. Lise Johnson & Brooke Güven, Securing Adequate Legal Defense in
Proceedings Under International Investment Agreements: A Scoping Study, Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (2019). See
also Daniel Behn et al., Empirical Perspectives on Investment Arbitration: What do we know? Does it matter?, Academic Forum on
ISDS Concept Paper 2020/1 (Jan. 2020)).

29

Possible Beneﬁts

Possible Costs

Table 2: Costs and Beneﬁts of High-Powered ISDS-Elevating DPMs
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For the SIRM, there does not appear to be any systemic measurement
or evaluation of impacts on other dimensions of law and policy, or on other
stakeholders, such as: Was the decision harmful for other private sector
competitors? Did it diminish other ﬁrms’ competitive positions? How did
resolution of the dispute aﬀect actors up and down the value chain such
as the investors’ suppliers and consumers? What are the eﬀects on other
stakeholders, such as local residents living near the project? And, as noted
above, what are the eﬀects on perceptions of government responsiveness and
accountability?
The World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group has highlighted related concerns about the World Bank’s investment climate work more generally:
[T]he social value of regulatory reforms—that is, their implications for inclusion and shared prosperity as reﬂected in eﬀects
on a range of stakeholders—has not been properly included in
the design of reforms and assessment of their impact. While
regulatory reforms need to be designed and implemented with
both economic and social costs and beneﬁts in mind, in practice,
World Bank Group support focuses predominantly on reducing
costs to businesses.32
There is a risk that DPMs—especially strong, ISDS-elevating DPMs
that prioritize resolution of investor complaints and avoidance of ISDS
claims—intensify policymakers’ focus on addressing the concerns of, and
measuring beneﬁts to, foreign investors to the exclusion of other stakeholders and considerations.33
32
33

Independent Evaluation Group, Investment Climate Reforms, xi (2015).

This approach could be contrasted to the World Bank’s Multilateral Guarantee Agency
and other multilateral or bilateral public investment guarantee agencies or risk insurance
programs that are not only explicit on the importance of social and environmental risk assessments, but also include requirements regarding project proponents’ consultations with
impacted communities. These requirements of risk insurers or guarantee can help prevent
investor-state disputes for which the insurer/guarantor may face liability. See, e.g., Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), MIGABrief: Supporting Mining Investments,
MIGA, World Bank Group, 3 (2013) (“Well-designed environmental and social programs can
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III. RETHINKING DISPUTE-AVOIDANCE STRATEGIES
DPMs, in principle, can be valuable mechanisms to bring a range of concerns
and interests related to complex projects to a common table, and to ﬁnd
means of reducing overall harms (including those faced by investors) and
maximizing overall beneﬁts. But deﬁning their objectives, and doing so
in a way that directly informs their design, is critical to their success. A
careful consideration of a country’s overall objectives not only with respect
to a particular project but with respect to the balance of various public
policy considerations can help to avoid unintended costs and consequences,
or the inequitable distribution of those costs over time and across diﬀerent
stakeholder groups.
DPMs that are designed for the purpose of avoiding ISDS merit further scrutiny. Those studying business strategy have recognized that litigation—or the threat of litigation—is a tool that, like lobbying, corporations
use as part of their non-market strategies in order to maximize their profitability.34 They may use litigation to “seek improved terms from federal,
state and municipal governments, to facilitate or to obstruct market entry, to ease or to tighten market access conditions, to lighten or to waive
taxes. Actions can be brought in the courts to enforce, to review or to annul
governmental decisions to promote corporate goals or to thwart those of others.”35 Societies widely recognize that companies should not have unfettered
powers to lobby lawmakers; and they recognize that good governance does
not mean lawmakers should accede to all demands for which corporations
lobby—quite the opposite. But there seems to be less awareness around the
use of litigation (or threats thereof) as a tool used by corporations to exerhelp manage reputational risks for project sponsors, reduce social conﬂicts within communities, protect the environment, and reduce political risks”); MIGA, Policy on Environmental
and Social Sustainability, MIGA, World Bank Group (2013) (discussing requirements for
project proponents to consult with aﬀected communities and, where relevant, secure Free
Prior and Informed Consent of Indigenous Peoples to projects).
34

Melissa Mialon, Boyd Swinburn & Gary Sacks, A Proposed Approach to Systematically
Identify and Monitor the Corporate Political Activity of the Food Industry with Respect to
Public Health Using Publicly Available Information, 16 Obesity Reviews 519 (2015).
35
Ewan Sutherland, Lobbying and Litigation in Telecommunications Markets: Reapplying
Porter’s Five Forces, 16 Info: The Journal of Policy, Regulation and Strategy for Telecommunications, Information and Media 1, 2 (2014).
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cise inﬂuence over the law. The threat or existence of an ISDS claim may
be too often seen as a signal that the government is doing something wrong,
as opposed to an example of potentially inappropriate corporate political
activity.
ISDS is costly for governments. The costs of litigation are high, and
claims for damages often reach into the hundreds of millions if not billions
of dollars. There are generally no requirements for claimants to have ﬁrst
pursued local remedies, no system to sanction claimants for making frivolous
arguments and demands, and no dependable mechanism for ﬁltering and
securing early dismissal of meritless suits. Thus, even when a government
is skeptical of the legal soundness of the claim, it may want to ﬁnd ways to
resolve rather than contest it.
As reﬂected by the SIRM mechanism, DPMs may seek to exploit that
uncertainty, and the high costs of ISDS, as a way to pressure “oﬀending”
agencies to resolve investor concerns. It is therefore decisively important
whether DPMs that seek to avoid ISDS disputes, by design, minimize or
reduce this threat and power, or amplify it by creating additional structures
that add to the pressure already exerted on relevant government entities.
Designing DPMs with the purpose of avoiding ISDS disputes may already be unduly narrow relative to the objectives of dispute-avoiding governments. A broader framing for the avoidance or resolution of investmentrelated disputes, including approaches to avoid and mitigate stakeholder
tensions before they escalate into legal conﬂicts, would allow countries to
consider approaches that allow for broad participation and the consideration of a range of stakeholders’ interests and policy considerations on equal
footing. For instance, a dispute avoidance approach could be one that focuses on mitigating social and environmental impacts through mandatory
due diligence and consultation processes, reducing the source of tensions
before disputes arise.
Such an approach—one that is designed to be more inclusive in terms of
the stakeholders able to raise concerns, issues addressed, and policy considerations evaluated—could be especially valuable in the sectors in which ISDS
disputes are most common, such as utilities, water and sanitation, transportation, extractive activities, and agriculture, in which important consid-
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erations of public policy, societal rights and well-being, and environmental
issues are at stake.36 Earlier and more robust mechanisms to address and
resolve the types of impacts and tensions prevalent in such projects could
yield far greater societal beneﬁts with more limited costs.

36

World Bank Group, Retention and Expansion of Foreign Direct Investment: Political
Risk and Policy Responses, 31 (2019).

